



Record of Interview

Project Title and Code: SIGAR LL-02: Lessons Learned from Aid Coordination in Afghanistan**Date:** February 2, 2015**Interviewees:** (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**SIGAR Attendees:** Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert / Consultant**Location:** Berlin**Purpose:** To solicit input from his experience (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**Non-attribution Basis:** Yes ☒ No ☐**Recorded:** Yes ☐ No ☒**Recording File Record Number:****Prepared By:** Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert, Consultant**Summary of Key Discussion:**

- Prior to the fall of the Taliban there was a UN presence; UNSMA; Resident rep; WFP; Weekly meeting about what people were doing; Lots of people who wanted to coordinate; Many people who did not want to coordinate; UN agencies themselves; UN development and political;
- After the Taliban fell it became much more difficult; Militarization of aid; Whole approach to aid was driven by the military imperative; Military as developer was seen as war on terror; Dominated; Military wanted to coordinate; Most aid organizations did not; NGO's were concerned about being viewed as military intelligence;
- Most aid was driven by donors; Link to bases for dual use; Not bad per se; Could not give massive amount for test; Needed quick impact and large scope; Underestimated scope of problem; Recipient doing development started slow; WB say that 17-20% of impact of aid in their report, 75% flamed out; Projects were crumbling before they were built; Major lesson to be learned; Needs to be improved; Better coordination; AG was against PRTs; Don't want different countries doing different things; Donors not interested in giving anything to DAD;
- CERP money was used, but it was too much; Strategy a function of COIN, not development; Blurred lines; Poverty reduction was lost; No qualitative outcomes, just white elephants;
- ASG was killing with coordination meeting, but hot air, all in English; Afghan to decide, but AG was not too successful; tried to get input for needs; AG was asked what was needed; \$30 billion;
- JCMB could be useful but has too many people; JCMB should be limited to providing a political forum and complimented by another process; Need a specific and dedicated Tea Club for development, Tea Club was not focused on development; More realistic than JCMB; coalition of allies is better than JCMB;
- More money is not better; Not a metric; TMAF came too late; Implies that we need to deliver something; Prioritization was weak; So many actors; Everything and nothing all at once; Always making deals;
- UNAMA should have been the coordinator in both political and development; More representative; Actual process was western led, so other non-traditional actors were not a part of it; UN role in Bonn was good; Time pressure was ambitious, but achievable; Brahimi did things opposite of his paper; UN depended on resources; Civilian NATO talking to political; 99% of responsibility; Insecurity was created by approach; Supported corrupt government;

Follow-up:

- (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)